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COMMENT
THE PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PRIVATE MOTOR VEHICLES
"Legal liability without financial responsibility is a barren right to
one who sustains injury by the wrongful act of another."' That principle
has been accepted as the premise of two kinds of modern legislation, which
are analogous insofar as each endeavors to remedy or to mitigate the loss to
an individual from a danger arising out of an industrial motorized society.
The earlier remedial statutes created a scale of payments based upon injury
or death, without reference to liability for negligence,' as compensation
for persons harmed in dangerous occupations) During the past quarter-
century,4 another kind of law has been adopted in the attempt to lessen the
dangers of the highways. Almost as soon as the negligent operation of motor
vehicles caused such an "appalling toll of human life and suffering" 5 that
public action became necessary, the state legislatures began passing laws
intended to increase safety on public roads. Yet, the harm to life and to
property was not lessened but rather constantly increased, so that it be-
came more important for the injured party to be compensated not merely
in law but also in fact.6
To achieve those related purposes, and especially to satisfy the demand
that a right of recovery should be one of substance rather than one merely
of form,7 a Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law has been generally
adopted in this country. This law, while it is similar to the same kind of
legislation concerning vehicles used for hire, applies primarily to the opera-
tion and ownership of motor vehicles by private persons. All except four
I. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 598, 147 N.E. 681, 694 (1925).
2. See Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 582, 589, 171 N.E. 294, 297 (1930)i
Opinion of the Justices, supra.
3. See Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
4. Cowment, 33 IoWA L. REV. 522, 525 (1948). In 1925, Connecticut passed a
Financial Responsibility Law proper, and Massachusetts enacted the only Compulsory
Liability Insurance statute for private motor vehicles. In 1950, the former kind of law
became effective in Oklahoma and in Washington. See notes 29, 32, infra.
5. O'Roak v. Lloyds Casualty Co., 285 Mass. 532, 189 N.E. 571, 572 (1934) 5 cf. Rose
v. Franklin Surety Co., 281 Mass. 538, 540, 183 N.E. 918, 919 (1933)i Opinion of the
Justices, supra note I.
6. See Compensation for Automobile Accidents, a Symposium, 32 COL. L. REv. 785
(1932); Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 LAW AND CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS 519 (1936) Comment, The Need for Revision of Financial Re-
sponsibility Legislation, 40 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1945).
7. Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566, 568, 129 Atl. 117, 118 (1925).
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states8 have passed some type of the law; the Florida statute, first passed in
1947, was revised and re-enacted by the 1949 legislature with only a few
modifications of the substantive provisions. Those alterations did not
affect the fundamental intention of these statutes, which is simply to ensure
payment for injury or damage by requiring that adequate provision be
made for the compensation of the injured party.'0 The method, a preventive
one, no more than facilitates the obtaining of compensation by forestalling
a deficiency in funds which would thwart the collection of payment.'' In
comparison, a curative means is provided by other legislation which is de-
signed to frustrate the evasion of payment.' 2 The analogy to these statutes
is imperfect, in view of the differentiation between the two methods.
Yet, both kinds of law merely vary in the exemplification of the same
principle, that financial responsibility should follow legal liability, which
the distinction between them indicates to be fundamental for discussing
these statutes.' 3 And since the common premise is not altered by the differ-
ence of two methods, the narrower position may be taken that the intention
and the inherent purposes of one of the methods are not changed by the
variations in detail and in scheme of the provisions composing the numerous
statutes. Instead, the identical or similar terms, and the typical schemes
of drafting these acts, constitute a basic Financial Responsibility Law
which may be studied as though there were a uniform statute construed by
the courts. Further, legislative regulation of the use of the highways gen-
erally is to prohibit or to prescribe modes of behavior for motorists, so as
to lessen the dangers to life and to property. This law is intended to make
more certain the collection of compensation for injury or damage. Still, the
doubly analogous nature of this law demonstrates that it is within the
broad power of the legislature to act for the safety of travelers and the wel-
fare of the people.'
4
The judicial interpretation and construction of these Financial Re-
sponsibility statutes has been both to achieve and to further the legislative
intention and the dual purposes of safety and compensation. Also, the con-
stitutionality of the basic features of this law has been uniformly upheld
by the courts of last resort. In these two problems, the underlying concep-
S. Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas, as of February, 1950.
9. FLA. STAT. § 324 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ; Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25050, F.S.A. § 324
(1949).
10. See notes 1, 5, 7 stra.
11. See note 7 sPra; Current Legislation, Financial Responsibility 4ct for the Opera-
tion of Motor Vehicles, 16 ST. JON's L. Ruv. 269 (1942)j Note, 20 N.C.L. REV. 198
(1942).
12. See note 7 supra.
13. See Opinion of the Justices, 8I N.H. 566, 568, 129 Ad. 1 17, 118 (1925),
14. Ibid.; Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 569-590, 147 N.E. 681, 681-691
(1925); accord, Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 AtI. 701 (1938).
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tion is that the public roads shall at all times be reasonably safe for tra-
velers who, exercising due care, should be protected from preventable
dangers.' 5 And the second problem, in addition to the extension of the
exertion of the police power in enacting these statutes, 6 is founded on the
meaning of the constitutional guarantees of the reasonableness and the
equality of state legislation.' 7 Even the initial classifications which limit
the scope of this law have been decided to be valid. Motor vehicles prop-
erly and reasonably form a separate class for legislation; "' and the injury
or damage which occurs on private property may be excluded from the
application of a statute to protect travelers on the public highways.1 9
The supposed increase of safety on the public roads has been relied
upon by the courts, not only in upholding the validity of these statutes, but
also to justify the two assumptions on which the actual effectiveness of
this law depends.2 0 One is the belief that " . . . there is no more certain
way of securing attention to the safety of human beings than by holding
those responsible for dangers to heavy and certain liability for injuries
arising therefrom."'" When the common law imposes liability upon the
operator, who may or may not be the owner, for the negligent use of a
motor vehicle, to make more certain the pecuniary responsibility is thought
to promote the exercise of due care by him.22 Still, the owner may not be
the only person to operate the vehicle; and then the rationale of this law
is to deter the giving of permission by the owner for the use by a financially
irresponsible person, unless the owner has confidence in the operator's.
carefulness.P
Following that idea, these statutes would require only financial respon-
sibility of the owner who would be liable under the common law, for the
harm caused by his vehicle.24 But when there otherwise would not be a
legal liability of the owner for another person's negligent use of the ve-
15. Opinion of the justices, 251 Mass. 569, 595, 147 N.E. 681, 693 (1925).
16. Ibid.
17. See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941) ; Sheehan v. State Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 140 Cal. App. 200, 35 P.2d 359 (1934), Watson v. State Div. of Motor Ve-
hicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481 (1931); Opinion of the Justices, si N.H. 566, 129-
Atl. 117 (1925); Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925).
18. Watson v. State Div., 212 Cal. 279, 285, 298 Pac. 481, 483 (1931).
19. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 603, 147 N.E. 681, 696 (1925).
20. See Montgomery v. Keystone Mutual Casualty Co., 357 Pa. 223, 227, 53 A.2d'
539, 541 (1947), Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 522, 177 Atd. 882
(1935).
21. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 598, 147 N.E. 681, 694 (1925); ee-
Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 582, 589, 171 N.E. 294, 297 (1930).
22. Guerin v. Mongeon, 49 RI. 414, 143 Ad. 674 (1928) i Opinion of the justices,
251 Mass. 569, 594, 147 N.E. 681, 694 (1925).
23. Guerin v. Mongeon, supra; Mason v. Automobile Finance Co., 121 F.2d 32, 35-
(D.C. Cir. 1941).
24. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 598, 147 N.E. 681, 694 (1925).
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hicle,23 many of these acts go so far as to make the owner liable on the basis
of his implied or express consent for its operation.2 6 Both provisions accept,
as the principle of liability, the doctrine that a motor vehicle is a danger-
ous instrumentality for the use of which the owner shall be held account-
able. 2' Thus, the requirement of financial responsibility should add to
public safety by reasonably regulating a dangerous undertaking," and is
founded on a reasonable classification insofar as the provision may apply
only to the owners, and not to operators who are not owners, of mo-
tor vehicles.29 Again, the extension of the doctrine of vicarious liability,
even though the operator is not the servant or agent of the owner, and the
consequential requirement of financial responsibility, are a reasonable and
uniform means to lessen the dangers of the highways.3 0 Therefore, on the
one assumption are based the primary feature of this law-financial re-
sposibility-and the secondary feature that ownership alone is sufficient
as the ground of liability.'
Next, the two facets of the primary feature of this law are derived
from the other assumption, which is that a direct correlation exists between
the failure to exercise due care and the non-payment of compensation
for injuries due to negligence. Most of these statutes require the giving
of some security for, or the satisfaction of, a final judgment awarding
compensation for past injury or damage arising from the negligent op-
eration of a motor vehicle.32 All of the acts impose, as a prerequisite for
the issuance or the retention of a license, the need of proof of the finan-
cial ability to respond in damages for future harm caused by the use
of a motor vehicle. 3  Since those provisions are an appropriate means to
bring about the exercise of care by motorists,3 4 the requirements operate as
25. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp, Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 412
(1943) 1 Guerin v. Mongeon, 49 R.I. 414-, 415, 143 Ad. 674, 675 (1928).
26. See Forrester v. Jerman, 90 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1937) c f. Gulla v. Reynolds,
151 Ohio St. 147, 85 N.E.2d 116 (1949); Dickinson v. Great American Indemnity Co.,
291 Mass. 368, 6 N.E.2d 439 (1937).
27. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 597-603, 147 N.E. 681, 694-696 (1925).
Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566, 567, 129 AtI. 117, 118 (1925).
28. Ibid.; Sheehan v. State Div., 140 Cal. App. 200, 204-206, 35 P.2d 359, 361-362
(1934).
29. See note 27 supra.
30. See notes 27, 28 supra.
31. See Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 600, 147 N.E. 681, 695 (1925).
32. See note 65 infra; see Rikowski v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of N.Y., 1 17 N.J.L. 407,
189 At]. 102, 104 (1937); Samson v. State, 55 Cal. App.2d 194, 197, 130 P.2d 452, 453
(1942).
33. See notes 38, 39, 40 insfra; see Shuba v. Greendonner, 271 N.Y. 188, 2 N.E.2d
536, 538 (1935).
34. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), Heart v. Fletcher, 184 Mi. 659, 53
N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (1945)i Ohlson v. Mealey, 179 Misc. 13, 37 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1942);
Nulter v. State Road Commn, 119 W.Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549, 550-552 (1937)1 Sheehan
v. State Div., 140 Cal. App. 200, 204, 35 P.2d 359, 361 (1934); Opinion of the
justices, 251 Mass. 569, 695, 147 N.E. 681, 693 (1925).
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conditions for the granting or the continuance of the privileges' 5 to operate
a motor vehicle or to utilize the public highways. The proper3' suspen-
sion or revocation of a license, for failure to fulfill those conditions, has
been unhesitatingly upheld by the courts in order to attain the desired
result. 7
However, whether these statutes actually accomplish any increase in
safety, by barring negligent operators from the public roads, depends upon
the typical schemes embodied in this law. 'Most of the statutes exact proof
of financial responsibility for both the past and the future, 38 although
two acts offer the alternative between proof for the past or for the fu-
ture 9 The others require the proof to be given only for the future, not
for harm which has already been inflicted. 40 So, the nature of the assumed
direct relationship is twofold. As to the past, the requirement of proof
and the punitive provisions are applied by the criterion of negligence,
not of financial inability to pay for injury or damage,4" accompanied by
the failure to pay compensation. 42 As to the future, the same standard
functions to indicate the probable recurrence of negligence and failure
to pay by a particular motorist. 4' Insofar as the assumption is valid, then,
the past-and-future-proof type of this law is the most effective both to
single out and to bar from the highways a potentially negligent and
irresponsible operator. The future-proof type and, to a lesser extent, the
alternative-proof type, work primarily to prevent the probability of the
recurrence of a failure to make payment, since the motorist need fulfill
only one of the two provisions.
Therefore, the provisions for requiring proof of financial responsi-
bility and for the withholding of a license, in effect, regard the financial-
ly irresponsible motorist as one who is more likely to be negligent, and
treat him as a member of a group which should be prevented from adding
with impunity to the dangers of the highways. 44 Because the criterion is
35. Reitz v. Mealey, supra; Heart v. Fletcher, supra; Nulter v. State Road Com'n,
supra; Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 522, 177 Ad. 882 (1935).
36. Ragland v. Wallace, 35 Ohio St. 523, 70 N.E.2d 118 (1946)5 Heart v. Fletcher,
sutra; Nulter v. State Road Comm'n, supra; Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 114
N.J.L. 522, 177 Atd. 882, 887 (1935); see Opinion of the Justices, 271 Mass. 582, 171
N.E. 294, 300 (1930). See Coinments, 22 MINN. L. REV. 264 (1937) 44 W. VA. L.Q.
401 (1938); 22 FLA. L.J. 17 (1948).
37. See notes 34, 35, 36 supra; Steinberg v. Mealey, 263 App. Div. 479, 33 N.Y.S.2d
650 (1942).
38. See notes 66, 67 infra.
39. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-1007 (1947); OKLA. STAT. § 47-524 (1947).
40. See notes 65, 68 infra.
41. Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 522, 177 Atl. 882 (1935).
42. Sheehan v. State Div., 140 Cal. App. 200, 35 P.2d 359 (1934).
43. Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 568, 147 N.E. 680 (1925).
44. Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio St. 147, 85 N.E.2d 116, 122 (1949); Christensen
v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1943); Reitz v. Mealey,
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negligence and the failure, rather than the inability, to pay for harm,
those provisions are within the scope and are a reasonable exercise of
the police power of the state.45 Also, the classification of this law is
based on the proper use of a privilege ;46 so that there is no discrimination
between rich and poor motorists which violates the constitutional guaran-
tee of equality, not of enjoyment or of ability but of opportunity or of
right or burden.4 7 Moreover, even though the enforcement of this law
. . may not render the highways of the state perceptibly safer, that
being its object it meets the sanctions of the Constitution." 48
There has not been a factual showing that this law does not aid in
the endeavor to lessen the danger due to the use of motor vehicles by
negligent and irresponsible operators. Still, neither is there any evidence
that these statutes have lowered the toll of injury and damage on the
public highways. Instead, it is common knowledge that the number and
rate of motor vehicle accidents, and the cost in life and in property, have
continually increased during the twenty-five year period in which all
of these statutes have been enacted. While there are other reasons for
the ineffectiveness of this law, 49 at least one lies in the nature of the
law itself.
Inasmuch as the operator or the owner may retain or regain the
license to use the public roads, by a showing of financial responsibility,
any increase in safety is limited, if not defeated, by the other purpose
of this law. An operator or an owner who has been found to be negligent
must also have been found to be irresponsible, before the punitive pro-
visions are applicable. But, whatever validity there may be to the view
that the irresponsible motorist is probably a negligent one, it does not
follow that the financially responsible operator will thereby become a
careful one, or that the financially responsible owner will never allow a
careless person to use his vehicle. Thus the result, and the dominant
intention of this law, is to ensure payment to the injured party of the
money due to him as compensation for damages from the negligent
314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941)i Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1933);
In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D.N.Y. 1933).
45. Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, supra.
46. Sheehan v. State Div., supra.
47. State v. Price, 49 Ariz. 19, 63 P.2d 653, 656 (1937); Nulter v. State Road
Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937); Watson v. State Div., 212 Cal. 279,
224, 298 Pac. 481, 483 (1931)i Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566, 570, 129 Ad.
117, 120 (1925).
48. State v. Price, suprai Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 At. 701 (1932).
49. See Note, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 126 (1938); Comment, 16 Sr. JOHN'S L. REV.
269 (1942)i Braun, The Need for Revision of Financial Responsibility Legislation, 40
liL. L. REV. 237 (1945); cf. Effect of and Problems Arising from Financial Respond-
bility Laws, A.B.A. PROC. INs. LAW SEC. 45, 47 (1944).
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operation of a motor vehicle by another person?50 A statute to attain that
purpose is within the power of the legislature to act reasonably for the
welfare of the people.?'
This law, upon the principle that the liability for a wrong should
be borne by the party who caused it," and in keeping with the legislative
function to remedy public evils, embodies a public policy against financially
irresponsible motorists.53 While not intended merely to assist the in-
jured party, 54 nevertheless the judicial interpretation and construction
of these statutes clearly has been in favor of the party to whom this
method provides security for the collection of recompense. 5' As between the
two parties, the legislative intent is to aid the injured resident, and is
not to benefit the tortfeasorj 6 nor the non-resident motorist who absents
himself from the jurisdiction so as to prevent recovery of damages.5 7
Also, the liability insurance which fulfills the requirement of proof of
responsibility is not intended solely to indemnify the owner or operator
against personal liability for negligence," but is to protect the public
from loss. The insured party should not be allowed to circumvent the
compensatory purpose by having contracted insurance with a corporation
which itself is financially unable to satisfy the judgment. Accordingly,
the requirement that the insurer be authorized to transact business in
the state has been construed strictly; so that it is not modified by an-
other statute permitting the placement of insurance with a non-admit-
ted insurer by a resident surplus line broker.' 9 This law, then, exacts from
the motorist a trustworthy proof of financial responsibility.
The tendency of the judicial opinions construing these statutes has
been at once to rely upon the safety purpose in order to sustain the
effectiveness and the validity of this law, and to extend the compensatory
purpose so as to achieve the fundamental intention of the legislature.
50. State v. Price, 49 Ariz. 19, 63 P.2d 653, 656 (1937)5 Opinion of the Justices,
271 Mass. 582, 590, 171 N.E. 294, 297 (1930)i Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass.
569, 594-598, 147 N.E. 681, 693-694 (1925). See Feinsinger, The Opiration of Financial
Responsibility Laws, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 519, 522-523 (1936)1 Comment, New
Approach to Problems of Financial Responsibility Mises Mark, I STAN. L. REv. 263,
264 (1949); Comrrtent, Motor Vehicle Financial and Safety Responsibility Legislation,
33 IOWA L. RErv. 522, 538 (1948).
51. Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 At. 701 (1938).
52. Ciwistensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., .215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 417-
418 (1943).
53. Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio St. 147, 85 N.E.2d 116, 122 (1949).
54. Ibid.
55. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) In re Egan, 265 App. Div. 44, 37 N.YS.
2d 983 (1942), aff'd, 290 N.Y. 790, 50 N.E.2d 108 (1943); see Steinberg v. Mealey,
263 App. Div. 479, 33 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1942).
56. Ibid.
57. Seymour v. Hawkins, 133 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
58. Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio St. 147, 85 N.E.2d 116, 122 (1949).
59. Samnson v. State, 55 Cal. App. 2d 194, 197, 130 P.2d 452, 453 (1942).
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The latter trend is founded upon the usual rule that remedial legisla-
tion should be construed liberally, both for the suppression of the evil
and for the better application of the remedy. 60 But that rule is subject to
qualification insofar as the construction of a statute should not inter-
polate purposes other than those for which it was enacted. 6 1 Also, it is
limited by the equally familiar rule that a statute in derogation of the
common law should be strictly construed.62 Those maxims of statutory
construction are exemplified primarily in cases arising under provisions
concerned with the purpose of compensating the injured party by ensuring
payment of damages.
To the extent that this law accomplishes that purpose, its effective-
ness is derived from the validity of the common law concept of pecuniary
compensation for injury or damage due to the negligence of another
person. This is presupposed by the dominant intention. Both the safety
and the compensatory purposes assume a direct relationship between the
non-payment of damages and the failure to exercise due care on the
highways; both aspects are subserved by the same requirement of finan-
cial responsibility for the harm caused in the past or the future by the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle, Hence these statutes are in
essence a legislative assurance that the injured party shall collect what
is his due, from another person whose liability is predicated upon fault.
6'
Further, the common law concept of liability for fault underlies the
criterion by which it is determined that an owner or operator of a mo-
tor vehicle shall be required to furnish the proof of financial responsi-
bility. When the common law imposes liability upon the operator, who may
or may not be the owner, for the negligent use of a motor vehicle, to
make more certain the pecuniary responsibility is thought to promote the
exercise of due care by him.6" And, with only three exceptions, the test
of applicability of the requirement of proof is the same in each one of
the two types of these acts. Many of the statutes exact proof only for
the future; but most require proof for both the past and the future, or
offer the alternative between proof for the past or for the future.
In the first type, the general criterion is either or both the non-
60. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 4.16
(1943); O'Roak v. Lloyds Casualty Co., 285 Mass. 532, 189 N.E. 571, 572 (1934);
see Gochee v. Wagner, 232 App. Div. 401, 403, 250 N.Y.S. 102, 105 (1931), rev'd bn
other grounds, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
61. Christensen v. Hernepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 416
(1943).
62. Wood v. White, 97 F.2d 646, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1938),
63. Ruel v. Langelier, 299 Mass. 240, 12 N.E.2d 735 (1938)1 Opinion of the
Justices, 271 Mass. 582, 590, 171 N.E. 294, 297 (1930). But cf. Senator Cab Co. v.
Rothberg, 42 A.2d 245 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1945). See Note, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 126,
134 (1938) ; Feinsinger, supra note 50 at 505, 518.
64. See note 22 supra.
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payment of a final judgment for past injury or damage, or the convic-
tion of a violation of certain major traffic laws.65 Under the other type
of these acts, the main standard is whether the owner's vehicle or the
operator has been involved, in any manner, in an accident resulting in
personal injury or death or in property damage.6 6 The three varia-
tions from type are that two of the past-and-future-proof statutes are
applicable upon the test used in the future-proof acts;67 and one future-
proof statute calls for fulfillment of the requirement as a condition pre-
cedent to obtaining a license to operate or to own a motor vehicle. 6"
All of the other statutes, then, concern a motorist or a vehicle owner
who has been exercising the privileges to use the public highways. Those
differences between the types of this law do not affect its validity. 69
Thus, when an adjudication is the basis of requiring the proof of
financial responsibility the standard is the substantive law which pre-
scribes the duties of a motorist. A judgment of private liability is tan-
tamount to a declaration of fault, either personally or vicariously,
70
of the party against whom it is rendered. For the adjudication to be
subject to this law, the complaint must have made allegations sufficient
to charge the defendant with liability,7' and the kind of harm for which
compensatory damages are awarded must be within the coverage of
65. ALA. C0i3: tit 36 § 74 (1940, Supp. 1947) ARIZ. CODE ANN. §66-248
(1939, Supp. 1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-14 (Supp. 1949), CONN. GEN. STAT. tit.
17, § 2457 (1949); DEL. REv. CODE c.165, § 5705 (1935, Amend. 1937, 1941, 1945);
D.C. CODE, § 40-401 (1940), § 1-1009 (Supp. VII 1941-1949); KAN. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-701 (Supp. 1947, Cum. Supp. 1949)5 Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9470.12 (1949),
MoN'r, Riv. ConEs ANN. § 53-401 (1947)i N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 39:6-1 (1940, Supp.
1947), N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-198 (1943, Supp. 1949); 01-to GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 6298-1 (1938, Supp. 1949)i PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1253 (1939, Supp. 1949)i
R.I. GEN. LAWS c.98, §1 (1938); W.VA. CODE § 1721.1 (1949).
66. CALIF. VE'HICI.E CODE ANN. c.2, § 410 (1947, Supp. 1949) ; COLO. STAT. ANN.
c.16, § 39 (1935, Supp. 1947); F.S.A. § 324 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 49-1101 (1948, Supp. 1949), ILL. ANN. STAT. C.951/'2, 586 (Smth-Iurd 1934, Supp.
1948); IND. STAT. ANN. § 47-1023 (Burns 1940) repealed, § 47-1044 (Supp. 1949),
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.275 (1946), repealed, 321 A.1 (1949), Ky. REV. STAT. §
187.010.280 (Supp. 1948); ME. REV. STAT. C.19 § 64 (1944)s MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
LAWS art. 56 § 164 (1939), art. 661/, § 85-97, 109-130 (Supp. 1947), MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 256.251 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.21 (Supp. 1948); NED. COMP.
STAT, § 60-601 (Supp. 1941), NEV. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 4439.01 (1949); N.H. REV.
LAWS, c.1 2 2, p.4 7 5 (1941); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-1007 (1947); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS
art. 1-A, § 94 (1941, Supp. 1949); N.D. REV. CODE § 39-14 (1943), OKLA. STAT.
ANN. § 47-524 (1947)- VA. CODe § 46-455 (1950), 2154 (Supp. 1948); WIS. STAT.
§85-09 (1947); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. art. 16 § 60-1601 (1947).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 125-3 (1939, Supp. 1949) ;VT. STAT. § 10,163 (1947).
68. MASS. LAWS ANN. C.90, § 34 B-J (1946, Supp. 1948).
69. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) ; Heart v. Fletcher, 184 Misc. 659, 53
N.Y.S.2d 372 (1945); Ohlson v. Mealey, 179 Misc. 13, 37 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1942);
Nulter v. State Road Comm'n, 119 W.Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937); cf. Opinion of the
Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 601, 147 N.E. 681, 696 (1925).
70. Except as the rules of liability may have been modified by statute.
71. Commonwealth v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1940).
COMMENT
the statute.7 2 A judgment for contribution, obtained by one co-defen-
dant against the other, is based on the negligence of the other co-de-
fendant and is subject to this law. 73 The compensatory purpose appar-
ently extends to an award of costs which, while otherwise incidentally
given to repay the expense of asserting rights,7 is handed down as
an essential part of the liability imposed by the judgment.7" A total
amount of damages and costs may be more than the minimum specified
by the statute, so that the requirement of proof of financial respon-
sibility is applicable even when the sum of actual damages is less than
the minimum.' 6
Again, the usual rule is that the violation of a major traffic law,
which was intended to protect the injured party against the harm in-
flicted, either is negligence in law or is evidence of negligence,7 7 for
a suit to recover damages. Even apart from a civil action, the con-
viction of a violation would indicate a lack of due care in the operation
of a motor vehicle, especially in view of the purpose of this law and
the assumption that probable negligence is correlated with financial irre-
sponsibility. So, in addition to being a decisive factor in the imposi-
tion of liability on a motorist, a judgment of conviction is one criterion
in the applicability of the requirement of proof of financial responsibility.
Finally, the requirement of proof is based on the occurrence of
an accident causing personal injury or death or property damage, or
on merely the likelihood that a motorist will be held liable for the harm
caused by the use of a motor vehicle. When the criterion is the former, the
implicit notion would seem to be that "accidents do not 'happen,' " and
that one or both of the persons was careless. While the vehicle or the
operator need only have participated "in any manner" in the accident,
that clause has been construed to mean no more than would ordinarily
be regarded as proximate cause. 7' A more liberal interpretation of that
72. Macheras v. Syrmopoulos, 319 Mass. 485, 66 N.E.2d 351 (1946) Mullen
v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 287 Mass. 262, 191 N.E. 394 (1934) ; Opinion of
the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 603-604, 147 N.E. 681, 696-697 (1925).
73. In re Egan, 265 App. Div. 44, 37 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1942), afi'd, 290 N.Y. 790,
50 N.E.2d 108 (1942).
74. Stevens v. Central National Bank of Boston, 168 N.Y. 560, 61 N.E. 904 (1901);
see Steinberg v. Mealey, 263 App. Div. 479, 33 N.Y.S.2d 650, 655 (3d Dep't 1942)
(dissenting opinion).
75. Steinberg v. Mealey, 263 App. Div. 479, 33 N.Y.S.2d 650 (3d Dep't 1942).
76. Ibid.
77. Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 (1929)i
Carlson v. Meusberger, 200 Iowa 65, 204 N.W. 432 (1925); Annis v. Britton, 232
Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128 (1925)i Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814
(1920)i Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 180 N.W. 87 (1920) Shell v. DuBois, 94
Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916)1 see note, 32 COL. L. Rxv. 712 (1932); Evers v.
Davis, 86 N.J.L. 196, 90 Atl. 677 (1917).
78. Baker v. Fletcher, 190 Misc. 40, 79 N.Y. Supp. 580 (2d Dep't 1948) Mullen
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phrase, so as to include a parked vehicle against which a pedestrian
was crusfied by another vehicle, 79 appears to go beyond the purpose
of this law.80 Accordingly, in order to achieve the dominant intention
of these statutes, there may be assurance of the payment of compen-
sation regardless of which party is later determined to have negligently
caused the harm and to be liable for damages,"
The same notion, slightly broader, underlies the one statute in
which the requirement of proof is founded on the likelihood that the
motorist will be held liable. This act, compelling the proof of financial
responsibility as a condition precedent to the issuance of a vehicle regis-
tration or an operator's license, 1 would seem to be predicated upon a
non-fault theory of liability and of responsibility. However, the statute
may be better understood by the truism that every motorist probably
will be negligent and cause harm to another at some time. Then, in
keeping with the compensatory purpose of this law, the proof of re-
sponsibility should be exacted from all motorists who are lawfully exercis-
ing the privileges of the highways."3 Since this statute does not change
the established rule of due care,84 it is based upon the usual concept
of liability for fault; and the real standard of applicability is the as-
sumption that probable negligence is directly related to financial ir-
responsibility. Therefore, all of these statutes extend the presupposed
common law theory, so as to encompass ensuring the payment of pe-
cuniary compensation, by virtue of at least a probability or at best
the certain adjudication that the person required to prove financial re-
sponsibility is the one liable for the fault and the harm.
This Financial Responsibility law is one recent form of legislation
which exemplifies the principle that the financial ability should accom-
pany the legal duty to recompense the injured party. In developing that
premise, some of these statutes have been drafted to be applicable by a
criterion which is little more than the probability that a motorist will
be held liable for the injury or damage caused by the negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle. To that extent, this law may be said to represent
a deviation from the common law, by imposing a duty to be able to make
v. Hartford Ace. and Indemnity Co., 287 Mass. 262, 191 N.E. 394 (1934) Perry v.
Chipouras, 319 Mass. 473, 66 N.E.2d 361 (1946) ; Caron v. American Motorists Ins.
Co., 277 Mass. 156, 178 N.E. 286 (1931).
79. Ohlson v. Mealey, 179 Misc. 13, 37 N.Y.S.2d 123 (3d Dep't 1942).
80. FLA. STAT. § 324.04 (2)(b), (2)(2) (1949).
S1. Compare Baker v. Fletcher, supra, Ohison v. Mealey, supra, wcith Mullen v.
Hartford Ace. and Indemnity Co., supra, Perry v. Chipouras, supra, Caron v. American
Motorist Ins. Co., supra.
82. MAss. LAws AN4N. c.90, § 34 B-J (1946, Supp. 1948).
83. Mullen v. Hartford Arc. and Indemnity Co., 287 Mass. 262, 191 N.E. 394 (1934).
84. Ruel v. Langelier, 299 Mass. 240, 12 N.E.2d 735, 736 (1938).
COMMENT
payment prior to the certain existence of the legal duty to make com-
pensation.
However, when the operator is not the owner of the motor vehicle,
the rationale of this law is to deter the giving of permission by the owner
for the use of the vehicle by a financially irresponsible person. 8 5 In
order to do so through requiring the proof of financial responsibility,
some of these statutes create a liability of the owner by an extension
of the doctrine of vicarious liability.8 6 While this may be in derogation
of the common law, especially when the provision is liberally construed,8 '
generally it also is in keeping with the common law rules which the
doctrine presupposes.88 And again the vital principle is that the loss
should be borne by the party whose lack of due care was the cause of
the harm. 9
Accordingly, on one hand a part of this law slightly deviates from
the common law notion of a certain duty to pay money for damages,
and another part somewhat derogates from the common law view of not
imposing that duty vicariously for the fault of a person whose actions
could not well be controlled. Each one of those positions is a develop-
ment from one of the assumptions of this law. The latter follows from
the belief that the certain way to increase the safety of human beings
is to increase the certainty of pecuniary liability and responsibility for
injury, 90 even when the exaction is from a party who most probably
was not at fault.9 And the former is a consequence of the dominant
intention of this law, to make certain the collection of payment by
the injured party, regardless of an uncertainty as to which party shall
85. See note 23 supra.
86. See note 30 supra3 see Senator Cab Co. v. Rothberg, 42 A.2d 245, 247 (Munic.
Ct. D.C. 1945).
.87. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943);
O'Roak v. Lloyds Casualty Co., 285 Mass. 532, 189 N.E. 571 (1934).
88. Rice v. Simmons, 53 A.2d 587 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1947)i Gasque v. Saidinan, 44
A.2d 537 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1945) 3 Senator Cab Co. v. Rothberg, 42 A.2d 245 (Munic. Ct.
D.C. 1945)- Schwartzback v. Thompson, 33 A.2d 624 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1943)i Champ
v. Atkins, 128 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1942)5 Hiscox v. Jackson, 127 F.2d 160, 161 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Mason v. Automobile Finance Co., 121 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1941)i Rosenberg
v. Murray, 116 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1940)5 Forrester v. Jarman, 90 F.2d 412 (D.C.
Cir. 1937); McNeil v. Powers, 266 Mass. 466, 165 N.E. 385 (1929) i Lennon v. L.A.W.
Acceptance Corp., 48 RI. 363, 138 Atl. 215 (1927)- cf. St. Joseph v. Grantham Motor
Sales, 29 Mich. 260, 257 N.W. 701 (1934).
89. See Sky v. Keystone Mut. Casualty Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 29 A.2d 230
(1943); White v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 202 Mass. 474, 19 N.E.2d 702 (1939);
Dickinson v. Great American Indemnity Co., 291 Mass. 368, 6 N.E.2d 439 (1937)1
Frankel v. Allied Mutuals Liability Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 218, 192 N.E. 517 (1934).
90. See notes 21, 23 supra.
91. See notes 31, 87 supra.
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have that right to be enforced. From the premise of certainty, this
law in part comes to a result of uncertainty.
Still, in other respects the fundamental provisions of all of these
statutes, which constitute the basic Financial Responsibility Law, have
not fallen into that inconsistency. The part of this law which is ap-
plicable on the basis of an adjudication reaches a certainty that the
pecuniary liability and responsibility is imposed upon the party who
was at fault in favor of the party who has a right to enforce the pay-
ment of compensation. True, there is an uncertainty in the effectiveness of
the requirement of proof of financial responsibility to accomplish an in-
crease of safety on the highways. Yet, that is due to the fallacy in the
position which has been summarized in the assertion that while an ir-
responsible motorist may probably be a negligent one, it does not fol-
low that a financially responsible owner or operator will not at some
time negligently cause harm by the operation of a motor vehicle. That
reasoning does not detract from the usefulness of these statutes to
achieve the dominant intention of ensuring payment to the injured party
of the money due to him as compensation for damages from the neg-




92. See note 81 sufta.
93. See note 50 sutra.
